

# **INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS**

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**HEARING**  
BEFORE THE  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE  
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY  
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS  
OF THE  
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS  
SECOND SESSION  
ON  
INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT  
DEPARTMENTS  
TESTIMONY OF LT. GEN. GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER

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**AUGUST 25, 1954**

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**PART 22**

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Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary



UNITED STATES  
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE  
WASHINGTON • 1954

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## SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

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<sup>1</sup> The Honorable Pat McCarran participated actively in the affairs of the subcommittee until his death, September 28, 1954.

## INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

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WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 25, 1954

UNITED STATES SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE TO  
INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE  
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER  
INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE  
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,  
*Orlando, Fla.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9 a. m., in the main courtroom, Federal Building, Orlando, Fla., Hon. Pat McCarran presiding.

Present: Senator McCarran.

Also present: Mr. Alva C. Carpenter, counsel; Mr. J. G. Sourwine, counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee; Dr. Edna R. Fluegel, professional staff member.

Senator McCARRAN. The committee will come to order.

General, would you take your seat, please.

General Stratemeyer, I want to pause at the beginning of this hearing to pay tribute to your distinguished record, to hail you as a truly great American, and to thank you for your many and signal services to our country. In that, I know that I speak the sentiments of the full subcommittee as well as for millions of your fellow-citizens. Nothing but the most profound anxiety in regard to the internal security of this Nation would have induced us to so intrude on your retirement or to require of you this additional service.

I know, however, that the measure of your devotion to this Nation is so great that, even in retirement, you, too, are driven by anxieties and haunted by the questions "why" and "how" and "who" and "where will it end"?

Ten years ago today, you could look beyond victory to a world at peace, to an America rising to new summits of greatness, to an era worth the awful blood price then being paid. Ten years ago, like most American military leaders and, indeed, most American citizens, you probably did not question the motives or the patriotism of those who made policy.

Today, we are sadder and wiser. We now know that while Americans were fighting and dying in every sector of the worldwide battle-front to win victory, other Americans were betraying their birth-right and ours to a still more deadly foe.

Eight years ago, you returned from China, rich in hard-earned knowledge of an area in which this Nation was most vitally concerned. Were you consulted? Was your advice sought during the tragic Mar-

shall mission or in the darkening storm that followed? When you returned to the Far East in 1949, what was your mission and that of the Far East Command? Was it adjusted to the realities of the fall of China and the alleged fact of the Soviet A-bomb? Did our policy-makers then turn from the architects of disaster to the men of experience and demonstrated wisdom they had ignored?

Four years ago today, you were heavily engaged, beating back the foe and planning for the master-stroke of Inchon and the great offensive northward.

Did you know, then, as you sent your men winging through the skies to fight to preserve our liberties, that some of the very individuals who were wrong and worse than wrong again and again were directing policy? Did you know then, as the enemy seemingly knew, that victory would not be authorized, that strategy would increasingly be determined by orders made by political commissars in Washington?

And, General, what of today? What of tomorrow? Where are the missionaries and traders, the soldiers and statesmen who gave to the Pacific "the friendly aspect of a peaceful lake", a "vast moat to protect us"? You know the answer. Not only in the Pacific but throughout the world events confirmed that "the Communist threat is a global one. Its successful advance in one sector threatens the destruction of every other sector. You cannot appease or otherwise surrender to communism in Asia without simultaneously undermining our efforts to halt its advance in Europe".<sup>1</sup> But we continue to appease—and to lose.

Is it any wonder, then, that throughout the length and breadth of this land the questions are asked "why" and "how" and "who" and "where will it end"? Is it any wonder that, in these days of peril, we are turning to men like yourself, men who should have been consulted and were not, men whose patriotism is tried and tested, men who, denied victory, have considered and analyzed and thought deeply over the events and the reasons for that denial?

As your former great commander, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, warned 3 years ago, "the issues are fundamental and reach quite beyond the realm of partisan consideration. They must be resolved on the highest plane of national interest if our course is to prove sound and our future protected."

That warning was not heeded, as so many of his warnings were not heeded. For victory, we substituted disaster. It is to explore some of the reasons for that disaster and, by exposure, to arouse the American people to their jeopardy, that we meet here this morning.

General, will you kindly rise and be sworn?

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

General STRATEMEYER. I do.

<sup>1</sup> Quotations from General MacArthur's address to Congress April 19, 1951.

**TESTIMONY OF GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER, LIEUTENANT GENERAL,  
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE (RETIRED), 2020 SUMMERLAND  
AVENUE, MAITLAND, FLA.**

Senator McCARRAN. General, will you kindly state your name, your place of residence, and your occupation for the record?

General STRATEMEYER. George Edward Stratemeyer; residence, 2020 Summerland Avenue, Maitland, Fla.

Senator McCARRAN. You may proceed, Colonel.

Mr. CARPENTER. You are a retired general at this time?

General STRATEMEYER. I am a lieutenant general, United States Air Force, retired.

Mr. CARPENTER. Would you please give the committee the background of your career?

General STRATEMEYER. I graduated from West Point in the class of 1915. I joined the infantry and was in the infantry for 1 year. I entered the aviation section of the Signal Corps in September 1916, and have been an active pilot until I retired in 1951.

Mr. CARPENTER. You took part in World War II and the Korean conflict?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. What were your duties at the beginning of World War II? Where were you assigned?

General STRATEMEYER. At the beginning of World War II, I was General Brett's executive in Washington, on December 7.

Senator McCARRAN. Can those in the rear of the room hear? If you cannot, we will have the instrumentalities adjusted here.

Perhaps, you can bring the microphone closer to you, General.

You may proceed.

Mr. CARPENTER. I believe you were giving—

General STRATEMEYER. I was General Brett's executive officer in Washington. He was then the Chief of the Air Corps and General Arnold was Commanding General of the Army Air Forces. Shortly after that, I was assigned to the Southeastern Air Corps Training Center which I commanded for 6 months, when General Arnold called me back to Washington to be his Chief of Staff. I occupied that position for 1 year. I went overseas in 1943 and remained there until February 1946.

I was General Stilwell's advisor and Air Force commander, Army Air Force commander, in India-Burma, and his advisor in China. I also commanded the Eastern Air Command under Lord Louis Mountbatten.

At the conclusion of the war in India-Burma, I then joined General Wedemeyer in the China theater and was his Army Air Force commander and his deputy theater commander. I remained there until the end of the war and on until February, when I returned.

During the period after the war, I moved 90,000 of Chiang Kai-shek's Chinese Nationalist troops to North China. After the war, I came home and with 5 days leave was immediately assigned to command and organize the Continental Air Command, which later became the Air Defense Command, and, later, again, the Continental Air Command. I remained in that command until April 1949, at which time I was asked by General McArthur, God bless him, to come to Japan and be his Air Force commander.

Mr. CARPENTER. General, I would like to retrace our steps to the China-Burma-India theater. When were you assigned to the China-Burma-India theater?

General STRATEMEYER. In July 1943.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you receive any briefing before you went to that theater?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes. I received a briefing by General Arnold, strictly military. I carried a message to Chiang Kai-shek from the President, and a message from General Marshall to General Stilwell. I was briefed principally that I was to go out there and resolve some misunderstandings between General Bissell, General Chennault, and General Stilwell, which I think I did.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you receive any political briefing on policy matters?

General STRATEMEYER. Very little. I was told of some of the problems that I had to face, but it was principally military.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you have any political advisors attached to your staff?

General STRATEMEYER. No, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you have contact with any of them over there?

General STRATEMEYER. Just casually. I knew one or two, but not well, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. Do you happen to know who they are?

General STRATEMEYER. I knew Mr. John Davies. I met him in New Delhi, India, but none of the others do I remember by name.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you know John Stewart Service?

General STRATEMEYER. No, sir. I might have met him, but I can't remember. It made no impression and I was too busy militarily.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you have occasion to compare the fighting qualities of the Communist Chinese and the Nationalist Chinese at the time you were in that theater?

General STRATEMEYER. Well, I never saw any Communist Chinese. I heard that they were agrarian farmers who were supposed to be fighting the Japanese, but I never heard that they did anything that amounted to anything.

Mr. CARPENTER. But you did have an opportunity to observe the Nationalist Chinese?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. What was your opinion of those troops?

General STRATEMEYER. At the time General Wedemeyer was in command of the theater and after he had made some reorganizations, and saw that they were properly fed and clothed, I think they would compare with any of the average troops fighting in World War II.

Mr. CARPENTER. There were various political conferences throughout the world during the period of World War II. Did you ever attend any of those conferences, General?

General STRATEMEYER. Just the one. I was at Teheran. I flew from India. No, not Teheran.

Mr. CARPENTER. The Cairo Conference?

General STRATEMEYER. The Cairo Conference. I attended the Cairo Conference with General Stilwell, Lord Louis Mountbatten, and General Chennault.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you take part in any of the meetings there?

General STRATEMEYER. I was present at the combined Chiefs of Staff meetings. I was present at the meeting, one of the meetings, which was held between President Roosevelt, Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Churchill. But I attended all the military meetings at the Cairo Conference.

Mr. CARPENTER. You were at no other conference?

General STRATEMEYER. No, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. Were you ever informed of the subsequent developments at the Teheran and later the Yalta conferences that affected your theater?

General STRATEMEYER. No, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. You had no communication whatsoever on that?

General STRATEMEYER. No, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. In 1945, General, what was your opinion of the future of China and the China-American relations?

General STRATEMEYER. Well, I can go back to when I left, February 1946. I left a fine commander who was head of the Air Force Advisory Group, now Maj. Gen. John P. McConnell, then brigadier general, and ample airplanes, spare parts, and fuel, and a fine nucleus for the Nationalist Chinese Air Force. I know that was true, also, of what the Navy had left and what the Army had left. I came home confident that the Generalissimo, whom I like and know and admire, would have no difficulty in taking over China, and establishing a democratic republic—I would rather use the words republican form of government. Chiang Kai-shek is an honorable man. His sole purpose in life today, and it was then, is to give his people those things in life, insofar as he could, which we enjoy here in the United States of America.

Mr. CARPENTER. When you left China in 1946, then, you had no inkling of disaster in that area?

General STRATEMEYER. None whatever.

Mr. CARPENTER. To what do you attribute the failure that happened after you left?

General STRATEMEYER. Well, I would say two things. The Marshall mission, in which they tried to associate Communists and Nationalists together and make it work.

Mr. CARPENTER. What is your opinion on that theory?

General STRATEMEYER. It is impossible. Nobody can work with a Communist. He is a liar; he is a thief; he is a murderer; he is a saboteur.

Mr. CARPENTER. I believe, when you were there, the United States had liaison officers or liaison missions with Chiang's forces, is that right?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. Those were later withdrawn?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir. I heard shortly after my return home, from a friend out there, that one of the first directives that was issued was that those liaison missions, upon whom the Chinese depended greatly, were withdrawn, and that was one of the causes of the failure.

The other cause was that we, the United States Government, did not keep its promise to the Generalissimo, and that was to maintain the equipment that we left there and give him sufficient spare parts, am-

muniton, et cetera, to continue his occupation of north China and to fight the Communists

Mr. CARPENTER. General, I have a map of China on the exhibit board here, and I wonder if you could show us what the effect was of the withdrawing of these liaison officers.

General STRATEMEYER. Well, we were clear up here [indicating]; I would say this is Nanking here, I would say this up in here was Peiping and Tientsin, and that [pointing] is where I flew these people from, way down around north of Canton and in this area that is not marked. We flew them up there—

Mr. CARPENTER. Up there—what part of China would that be?

General STRATEMEYER. That would be what is called north China, not Manchuria, up in the area of Peiping, Tientsin, and that general area. So, when we withdrew our liaison people upon whom the Chinese depended so greatly, and had every reason to believe that they would continue there, that helped their failure to fight the Communists.

The other was that all the supplies, the spare parts, and the maintenance of the equipment that we promised, was not given to them.

Mr. CARPENTER. Why were they not given, do you know?

General STRATEMEYER. No, sir. That was a decision of the Government.

Mr. CARPENTER. At this time, Senator, I would like to introduce the maps to which General Stratemeyer referred and make it a part of the record.

Senator McCARRAN. They will be made a part of the record.

(The maps referred to were marked "Exhibits 455A and 455B" and appear on pp. 1738, 1739.)

Mr. SOURWINE. Colonel, before you leave the period prior to 1945, may I ask a question?

Mr. CARPENTER. I would be happy for you to do so.

Mr. SOURWINE. General, you stated that you knew Mr. John P. Davies, Jr. Would you tell us what you remember about him and your acquaintance with him in China?

General STRATEMEYER. Well, my acquaintance was casual. I first met him in Delhi, met his wife, a very attractive lady, and I liked him there. The next time that I talked with him, I believe that it was in Chungking, at which time this problem of the agrarian farmers, Communists, came up. As I remember, he made that statement and thought that they were doing a good job against the Japanese, and that we should assist them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it true, General, that the Communists were doing a good job against the Japanese in the war?

General STRATEMEYER. I don't know anything that they did that was good, to my recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were in a position to know, were you not?

General STRATEMEYER. Well, I would say "Yes" and "No." I never flew to Yen-an, their headquarters. My successor did, General McConnell. I never came in contact with them at all. When we took these Chinese, these Nationalist Chinese, up north, I knew them. I knew their officers, but I never came in contact with any of the Communists.

Mr. SOURWINE. But in all the time you were in China, you had no wires, no news, no reports of any victories by the Chinese Commu-



nists or any successes they achieved which would help the cause against Japan?

General STRATEMEYER. None that I remember, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. General, I want to inquire about 1 more matter, or perhaps 2. You mentioned Chiang Kai-shek and your opinion of him. I would like to ask on this one point, is there any question in your mind about whether Chiang was and is a friend of the United States of America?

General STRATEMEYER. There never was a question of that. He is a friend of the United States of America. Don't forget, he fought a war against the Japanese right up until 1945, long before we ever got into any war with the Japanese.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say you are convinced he still is our friend in spite of the fact that, as you have alleged, the United States did not keep our promises to him?

General STRATEMEYER. I do, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mentioned flying 90,000 Chinese north. Where do you mean north? Where did you fly them to?

General STRATEMEYER. We flew them up into the Tientsin-Peiping area, from the area north, there, of Canton.

Mr. SOURWINE. You flew equipment with them?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir. We even flew mules.

Mr. SOURWINE. Ammunition and supplies?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. So that as you left them up there, they were a self-sustaining unit for a period of time?

General STRATEMEYER. I would say for a period of time; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you consulted about the advisability from a strategic or tactical standpoint of flying those troops north?

General STRATEMEYER. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were simply given the mission and you performed it?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. What happened to those troops afterward, General?

General STRATEMEYER. Well, I don't know. I think a lot of them were forced to fight against us in Korea. They had no ammunition, they had no spare parts, they couldn't fight. They had to live, so the Communists took them over, and those they didn't kill, I think they forced into their services.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, those troops were taken up north and left there, stranded, at the mercy of the Communists; is that a fair statement?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. General, do you know, when those troops were flown north, what arrangements had been made or what promises had been entered into with regard to supplying them?

General STRATEMEYER. No, sir; I don't know. All I know is that we promised them that we would supply them.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was your assumption——

General STRATEMEYER. I knew the air picture and there was no question but what we could take care of the air.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it your assumption that it was intended to continue to supply them by air?

General STRATEMEYER. No, sir. No, sir. There was no reason to supply them by air. There is a good railroad all the way up there.

Mr. SOURWINE. All you knew was that there was an agreement that they would be supplied?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were they supplied?

General STRATEMEYER. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know why not?

General STRATEMEYER. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Thank you.

I have no more questions at this time.

Senator McCARRAN. All right, Mr. Carpenter.

Mr. CARPENTER. Were you ever alerted, General, to developments in the Amerasia case?

General STRATEMEYER. No, sir; I never even heard about it out there.

Mr. CARPENTER. Were you ever asked about the individuals involved in the Amerasia case?

General STRATEMEYER. No, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. Were you ever consulted on China problems during or after the failure of the Marshall mission?

General STRATEMEYER. No, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you receive a copy of the Wedemeyer reports on China and Korea?

General STRATEMEYER. No, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. Were you ever asked during this period about Americans who had been in the China theater and who were under investigation?

General STRATEMEYER. No, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. Now, I would like to go to the period when you were Commander of the Air Forces in the Far East, with headquarters at Tokyo, Japan. Did you receive any briefing, General, before you left for your Tokyo assignment?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir; a very good military briefing.

Mr. CARPENTER. Were you briefed on the political situation?

General STRATEMEYER. No, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. What was the mission of the Far East Air Forces when you took command in Tokyo?

General STRATEMEYER. My mission was to defend the occupation and the islands of Japan.

Mr. CARPENTER. Were you informed of a reevaluation of China Far Eastern policy then in process?

General STRATEMEYER. No, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. Was your mission changed at any time before the Korean war in the wake of this reevaluation?

General STRATEMEYER. No, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you have occasion to meet Philip Jessup when you were in Tokyo?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you have a conversation with him?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir. One day I was busy in my office and I got a call from Mr. Jessup that he would like to see me in his office. I immediately contacted General MacArthur and told him of the request and asked if he had any instructions, and he said, "No,

Strat, just go over there and tell the truth," which I did. Mr. Jessup, in his conversation with me, attempted, over and over, to convince me that Formosa was not needed in our periphery defense.

Senator McCARRAN. We will pause for a moment, General.

Very well, you may proceed now.

General STRATEMEYER. I will repeat. Mr. Jessup, during my visit, tried to convince me, time and time again, that the island of Formosa was not necessary to the free world. This was absolutely contrary to what I thought and I knew what General MacArthur thought, and I so told him.

Mr. CARPENTER. What access did you have to information from Formosa and Korea at that time?

General STRATEMEYER. I had none.

Mr. CARPENTER. That was not within your military responsibility?

General STRATEMEYER. No, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. Now, General, I would like to go to the period of the Korean war. I have a letter here that I would like to read, and then get your comments. The letter reads as follows:

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,  
Washington, May 23, 1951.

Hon. RICHARD B. RUSSELL,

*Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,  
United States Senate*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: On Tuesday, May 8, 1951, you asked me the following question:

"General, can you supply for the record the directives and orders and memoranda sent to General MacArthur by the Department of Defense containing these restrictions or any restrictions that were imposed on him in the conduct of the campaign?" (p. 911 of the testimony).

I have had the Joint Chiefs of Staff examine their records and I have been supplied with the following paraphrased excerpts of all military directives and orders sent to General MacArthur containing restrictions, either direct or indirect, on the conduct of the campaign in Korea. These excerpts are arranged in chronological order and have been paraphrased in such a way that they may be printed in the record of the hearings.

As you know, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a large number of messages to General MacArthur on a wide variety of problems incident to the campaign in Korea. In response to your question, however, the following excerpts relate only to directives and orders containing restrictions:

"(a) On June 25, 1950, General MacArthur was informed that, to assist in evacuating United States dependents and noncombatants (names to be furnished by the United States Ambassador in Korea), he could take action by Air and Navy to prevent the Inchon-Kimpo-Seoul area from falling into unfriendly hands.

"(b) On June 26, 1950, at the direction of the President, the commander in chief, Far East (CINCFE) was authorized to utilize Navy and Air Force elements of the Far East Command to attack all North Korean military targets (troop columns, guns, tanks) south of the 38th parallel in order to clear South Korea of North Korean military forces. In the same dispatch he was authorized to use naval forces of the Far East Command in the coastal waters and sea approaches of Korea without restriction.

"(c) On June 29, 1950, CINCFE was authorized to extend his operations into North Korea against air bases, depots, tank formations, troop columns, and other purely military targets. He was cautioned that special care would be taken to insure that operations in North Korea stay well clear of the Manchurian and Soviet borders. Utilization of Army forces was limited to communications and other essential service units, except that the employment of Army combat and service forces, as might be required to insure the retention of a port and air base in the general area of Pusan, was authorized.

"(d) On June 30, 1950, the limitation on the employment of Army forces imposed on June 29, 1950, was rescinded.

"(e) On July 1, 1950, instructions were issued to CINCFE stating that he should be careful that in establishing a naval blockade of Korea his forces stay well clear of the coastal waters of Manchuria and the U. S. S. R.

"(f) On August 28, 1950, instructions were issued to CINCFE that particular care should be taken that United States aircraft not violate Soviet or Chinese territory or territorial waters.

"(g) On September 8, 1950, a message was dispatched to CINCFE stating that, for the present, no further attacks should be made against Rashin.

"(h) On September 26, 1950, CINCFE was directed that his Air Force units would be employed only against objectives which had bearing on the tactical situation.

"(i) On September 27, 1950, a directive was sent to CINCFE which stated that his forces would not cross the Soviet or Manchurian borders under any circumstances, that only Korean ground force units would be used in the north-east province bordering the Soviet Union and the area along the Manchurian border, and that support of U. N. operations north or south of the 38th parallel would not include air or naval action against Manchurian or Soviet territory.

"(j) On November 6, 1950, CINCFE was directed to postpone until further orders bombing of targets within 5 miles of the Manchurian border. Later the same day he was authorized to go ahead with planned bombing near the frontier but was cautioned that his forces must be extremely careful to avoid violating Manchurian territory and air space.

"(k) On December 29, 1950, CINCFE was directed to conduct a ground defense from successive positions generally as outlined in a message from CINCFE to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was told that, subject to the primary consideration of safety to the forces under his command, he would inflict on the enemy such damage as was possible.

"(l) On January 9, 1951, his instructions of December 29, 1950, were confirmed with an additional reference to his basic mission of protecting Japan. He was told further that favorable action would not be taken at that time on certain of his proposals as follows:

"(1) Strengthening of our effort in Korea.

"(2) Blockade of China coast.

"(3) Naval and air attacks on objectives in Communist China.

"(4) Obtaining Korean reinforcements from the Chinese Nationalist garrison in Formosa.

"(m) On January 21, 1951, CINCFE was told that the restriction regarding Rashin, which had been imposed on September 8, 1950, must remain in effect for the present.

"(n) On March 1, 1951, the request of the commanding general, Far East Air Forces, transmitted by CINCFE, to destroy the North Korean electrical power complex, including plants on the Yalu River, was disapproved."

Faithfully yours,

(Signed) G. C. MARSHALL.

General, does that letter from Secretary of Defense Marshall actually reflect all military directives as it purports to reflect them?

General STRATEMEYER. As I recall, it does.

Mr. CARPENTER. Was authority to bomb the Yalu bridges eventually given?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir, but with restrictions.

Mr. CARPENTER. To what extent was effective bombing under the limitations possible?

General STRATEMEYER. Well, we were a bit successful but we were restricted to the air over North Korea only. In other words, we could not violate the air over Manchuria. In order to hit a target in your bomb run, you have to fly a straight course and you usually try to bomb generally along the length of the bridge and not cross-ways. Consequently, with the restrictions we had, it was very difficult to do, although we took one bridge out there between Sinuiju and Antung, which is this lower bridge [indicating]. I will go up to the map. This is a double bridge, a railroad bridge and a vehicular bridge. We took one out on this side [indicating], and we damaged

the other. These bridges [indicating]—of course, this river, the Yalu, as it is on this map, does not show how the river bends, but in order not to violate the air over Manchuria, Communist China, we could not fly our bomb run the length of the bridge to take it out. We had to fly on a tangent. We could not go over midstream, and with the curvature of the river, at times particularly where it was concave, it was almost an impossibility.

Senator McCARRAN. It was over these bridges that the Chinese Army was coming in hordes, was that not true, and bringing all of its supplies?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir; particularly these bridges [indicating]. Every night, particularly after November 24, that was a lighted highway.

Senator McCARRAN. What did you observe, General, as to the amount of supplies that the enemy had on the north side of the river?

General STRATEMEYER. We saw them piled up. There is a fine airdrome here, a couple of fine airdromes here. We could see with our reconnaissance and even with the eye. I saw them myself.

Mr. CARPENTER. When you say "here" would you name the location?

General STRATEMEYER. Antung airport is right about here [indicating] and there is another one up a little ways. This whole area north of the bridge, this bridge, in there we could see the supplies, the trucks, and material, stacked up, but we were not permitted to hit it. To be successful in the air, our great strategy is to hit the supplies, the bases from which the material comes to maintain the enemy at the front. We were not permitted to do it. Furthermore, we would go after some of these Communist airplanes, and knew we could shoot them down, but we were not permitted to follow them in and shoot them down.

Mr. CARPENTER. You were not permitted to follow them north of the river?

General STRATEMEYER. No, sir. I would like to make another statement, Senator McCarran. On this side of the river—

Senator McCARRAN. The north side?

General STRATEMEYER. The Manchurian side. It was literally lined with anti-aircraft, and later in the war, became lined with the finest radar anti-aircraft, I believe, that exist. So any time we went up there, when we did bomb, not only could these people make passes at us and then go back over the border into their sanctuary, but we were not permitted to take out this anti-aircraft that was continually firing at us.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that anti-aircraft careful not to shoot south of the Yalu?

General STRATEMEYER. No, sir. We destroyed this airport south of Sinuiju. I burned that whole town, and took that out. But all the time we were in there, with the fighters taking out the anti-aircraft on this side, and our bombers in there, there was just a line of fire from the north side against us.

Mr. SOURWINE. While you are talking about the bridges, General, there is one point that has not been brought out yet in any of the discussions before this committee as far as I know.

After you take out a permanent bridge or drop one into the river, it is the function of the enemy engineers to provide ponton bridges to replace it, is that correct?

General STRATEMEYER. That is correct. They did it overnight.

Mr. SOURWINE. It would then be the normal function of our air to take out those ponton bridges as fast as they put them in, is that right?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir. We did that several times.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were so restricted all you could do was take out a ponton or two on your side of the river, is that not correct?

General STRATEMEYER. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't that make it rather simple for the enemy to reconstruct the bridge; they could swing in a ponton and have the bridge reconstructed?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir; they did it overnight. We took these bridges out and the next morning there would be a ponton bridge across. We attempted to take that out and the next morning it would be back in place and they would probably use it all night.

Mr. CARPENTER. General, at this time, I would like to read some excerpts from the congressional hearing relative to the military situation in the Far East.<sup>2</sup> On page 741, Chairman Russell asked the following question:

CHAIRMAN RUSSELL. When did General MacArthur first recommend to the Joint Chiefs approval of his policies for extending the war into Manchuria by air bombardment and by a blockade of the China coast?

And, General Bradley answered:

General BRADLEY. Well, about as soon as the Chinese began coming in. His first message on the subject was about November 6, in which he wanted to attack the bridges across the Yalu, and this was the first intimation that we had that they were coming across in great force. And we held him up on that bombing until we could check on it, and then gave him permission to go ahead and bomb the Korean end of the bridges. And then from then on there were intimations that he would like to go right on into Manchuria and bomb the bases across the Yalu, beginning, oh, around November 6 or 8, from then on.

Then, reading further on pages 1233 and 1234:

General COLLINS. Well, that intelligence, practically all of it, came from the Far Eastern Command itself. I have a summary of an exchange of cables between General MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in early November, which has considerable relevancy to the Far East Command's intelligence coverage of Chinese intervention in Korea.

On the 6th of November, in a cable requesting permission to bomb the Yalu River bridges, General MacArthur stated—I don't know whether this is a paraphrase or not, so I think it should be reviewed by whoever is reviewing the testimony here:

"Men and material in large force are pouring across all bridges over the Yalu from Manchuria. This movement not only jeopardizes but threatens the ultimate destruction of the forces under my command."

Senator McMAHON. That, General, is after the Chinese actually intervened.

General COLLINS. No, sir; this is on the 6th of November. The main Communist, Chinese Communist attack, was on the 24th of November.

Senator McMAHON. But if these Chinese were pouring over the bridges of the Yalu into Korea, then they were in the process of intervention at that time.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; they were getting ready to intervene, you might say. Actually, of course, their crossing the frontier was an intervention, but this is before they actually appeared in force as located by military troops in the field. These were picked up by air reconnaissance, I assume.

<sup>2</sup> Excerpts from Military Situation in the Far East, hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, 82d Cong., 1st sess., to conduct an inquiry into the military situation in the Far East and the facts surrounding the relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur from his assignments in that area, pt. 2, May 15, 16, 17, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 1951.

On page 1263, it reads:

Senator WILEY. General, what was the reply after that message of November 7 in which MacArthur asked the Chiefs for instructions to deal with the new threat? What did you say to him?

General COLLINS. Let me check now, Senator, a moment, if I might. I know that we sent him a definite directive.

Senator WILEY. Well, I would like the substance of it. Tempus fugit.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir. This summarizes their reply to CINCFE on the same date:

Joint Chiefs of Staff, in view of alarming situation which CINCFE had reported, authorized him to undertake the planned bombing in Korea near the frontier including target at Sinuiju, the Korean end of the Yalu bridges, provided CINCFE at the time of the receipt of the message still considered such action be essential to the safety on [of] his forces. He was not authorized, however, to bomb any dams or powerplants on the Yalu River.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out that because of the necessity for maintaining the optimum position with regard to the United Nations policies and directives and because it was vital to the national interests of the United States to localize the fighting in Korea, extreme care should be taken to avoid violation of the Manchurian territories and air space. Hostile action from Manchuria was to be reported promptly.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff further pointed out that it was essential that they be kept informed of important changes and requested that CINCFE submit the estimate which had been previously called for as soon as possible.

Now, General, from that testimony, do you consider that was clarifying the situation or was it misleading?

General STRATEMEYER. I would say it was negative. I would say General MacArthur did not get what he asked for.

Mr. CARPENTER. Would you be surprised, General, to know that many Americans interpreted this to mean that authority to take out the bridges was granted after a short delay, after they had talked the situation over here in Washington?

General STRATEMEYER. We got authority to bomb over the south end of the bridges.

Mr. CARPENTER. That was the end of the bridge?

General STRATEMEYER. That is the end, yes.

Mr. CARPENTER. But not the entire bridge, as you testified heretofore?

General STRATEMEYER. We never had authority to do that.

Mr. CARPENTER. And it was not an effective method of bombing?

General STRATEMEYER. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may I break in?

Mr. CARPENTER. Go right ahead.

Mr. SOURWINE. General, you heard read the paraphrase in which General Collins testified that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in view of the alarming situation which CINCFE had reported, authorized him to undertake the planned bombing in Korea near the frontier including targets at Sinuiju, the Korean end of the Yalu bridge, providing CINCFE at the time of the receipt of the message still considered such action to be essential to the safety of his forces.

That means considerably more than thinking it militarily advisable, does it not?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir. How well I remember that message, because the other message, I assisted in the preparation that went forward, that requested permission. General MacArthur had stated he wanted to burn Sinuiju and take this end of the bridge out and asked for authority. It was first turned down.



Mr. SOURWINE. Did he state that in the first message he considered the accomplishment of his recommendations essential to the safety of his forces?

General STRATEMEYER. I am positive he said that; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is a very strong statement, is it not?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And yet the authority which was given him was not as broad as the authority he had requested, was it?

General STRATEMEYER. No, sir; they never were, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, is it not a fact that the tenor of this message, while it appears to grant permission, also involves necessarily the implied order not to bomb unless the safety of his forces was essentially involved?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, he had to still plead that he was virtually in extremity, that he was in a dire position, in order to go forward with the bombing even under the limited orders which he got?

General STRATEMEYER. That is correct, sir. But we bombed and burned the minute we got that signal.

Mr. SOURWINE. Because the situation was still an extremely dangerous one?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Thank you, General.

Senator McCARRAN. At that time, were the Chinese coming across those bridges for the attack on our forces?

General STRATEMEYER. Well, as you look back, Senator, there is no question about it. I hope it will be developed a little later [what happened] on the 24th, 25th, and 26th of November, but those [who came over about November 6] were the "volunteers" that they talked about in the press that were coming over to help the North Koreans.

Senator McCARRAN. At that time they were the volunteers, but later they became the organized army of the enemy, is that true?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir. Armies.

Mr. CARPENTER. General, did you find sometimes there was confusion in the issuing of orders or authority, that sometimes when the authority was initially denied it sometimes would be granted but at the time it was granted it would be too late to be effective?

General STRATEMEYER. I think that happened at times, particularly in Rashin, that is a good example, up there on the east coast of Korea where we bombed that through the overcast and missed it by about a half-mile. It was so close to Siberia—they said close—17 miles away—and we never make an error like that. But they restricted us. They were afraid we would get into Siberia. Why they were scared, I don't know. But we were not permitted to go back and bomb Rashin until long after I left.

They finally did take it out. But that was a great transshipping point from Siberia to North Korea, at which point they loaded ships and trucks and sent them down to the North Koreans.

Mr. CARPENTER. Then, at times you would ask for reconsideration on authority to do certain things and sometimes it would be granted, is that right?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. How valid were the fears cited in justification for denying authority? Is it not a fact that when authority was later



granted, the fears on which the previous denials were based were proved to be false?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. Was there any real danger of Soviet intervention? I would like for you to develop that.

General STRATEMEYER. I would like to elaborate on that a bit. General MacArthur didn't fear the Russians a bit and I didn't, nor did General Walker or any of us over there. In the first place, I think they were scared to come in, and had we gone into Manchuria by air and done as we pleased up there to stop these people from coming south and killing our American boys, I don't think Russia would have done anything. She is in this thing to get all she can without getting a Russian soldier killed. General MacArthur wasn't scared of her, and I don't think any of us were. I surely wasn't.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you feel equipped and able to carry on your part of the mission?

General STRATEMEYER. Do you mean against Russia?

Mr. CARPENTER. To drive the Chinese out of North Korea.

General STRATEMEYER. I felt this way, at that time—and this is around November 25, 26, up to the first week in December—that is when, through General MacArthur's master stroke where he had [ordered] this attack and expected to go to the Yalu River; that is when they ran into all these Chinese who were over there in force. Had he not done that, I think the Eighth Army might have been destroyed. Certainly, General Milburn's corps would have been destroyed.

Now, at that time, I had sufficient air, bombardment, fighters, reconnaissance, [so] that I could have taken out all those supplies, those airdromes on the other side of the Yalu; I could have bombed the devils between there and Mukden, stopped that railroad operating, and the people in [of] China that were there fighting could not have been supplied. I don't say that was true a year from then, when all the MIG's came in and everything else, but at that time they did not have a lot of Air, and I had sufficient Air to do just what General MacArthur wanted to do. But we weren't permitted to do it.

As a result, a lot of American blood was spilled over there in Korea.

Mr. CARPENTER. You are familiar, of course, with the advance on November 24?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir. I was there with General MacArthur at Sinanju.

Mr. CARPENTER. How do you feel about that campaign?

General STRATEMEYER. At the time, we expected to go right to the Yalu. General Milburn's corps was almost to Sinuiju. We expected and so did General MacArthur, that the few Chinese that supposedly had come across were not going to interfere too much. But, then, lo and behold, the whole mountainside turned out to be Chinese that had gotten over there. It was only a few miles down there from the Antung bridge. So they streamed over at night and it was due to that attack of General MacArthur's that General Walker led that I think saved the Eighth Army. Otherwise, these people would have gotten in between us and we would have gotten separated, maybe, and we might have been destroyed.

Mr. CARPENTER. In other words, he took advantage of the situation before the Chinese were able to get organized, is that a fair description?

General STRATEMEYER. It turned out that way; yes, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. In other words, then, that advance could not be considered—that advance and withdrawal could not be considered an error of any consequence?

General STRATEMEYER. It was not an error. I think it was a masterful stroke. It is comparable almost to the Inchon landing. It was a brilliant thing that General MacArthur did.

Mr. CARPENTER. Were there any other alternatives that could have been done?

General STRATEMEYER. I don't know of any. You get in war to win it; you do not get in war to stand still or lose it. And we were required to lose it. We were not permitted to win. Later on, after I left, General Van Fleet had them on the run and he could have taken them and he wasn't permitted to do it.

Mr. CARPENTER. It all goes back to the basic reason they were not permitted to continue; is that right?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir; and I certainly wasn't permitted to do a job at the time when I could have done it, and I had ample Air [power]. I don't care what anybody says back home that I didn't have enough Air to do the job. At that time, I did have enough Air to do the job and I could have done it.

Mr. CARPENTER. General, I would like to read just a few excerpts from a statement by Lowell Limpus which was placed in the Congressional Record on March 18, 1952, by Representative W. J. Bryan Dorn, of South Carolina. The article reads, in part:

Convincing evidence that Gen. Douglas MacArthur could have won the Korean war easily, if Washington had permitted him to do so, was offered here today by the expert best qualified to know and judge the facts.

Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, until recently commander of all United Nations Air Forces in Korea, declared flatly that General MacArthur would have decisively defeated the Chinese Reds if his superiors had followed his advice and let him alone. The veteran airman added, however, that the opportunity for such a smashing victory—without heavy losses—no longer exists. Washington frittered it away long ago.

Breaking the long silence which had been imposed upon him by military regulations until his retirement a short time ago, the commander in chief of the Far East Air Forces explained: "We could have smashed them completely, if we could have crossed the Yalu River at the right time. I had the planes and the boys were anxious to cut loose. General MacArthur wanted to let me go. We had control of the air and practically no opposition—except some antiaircraft fire.

"If MacArthur's hands hadn't been tied, we were prepared to pulverize the Communist airdromes, supply lines, and depots so completely that they never again could have moved any large number of troops or equipment southward. They'd never have gotten near the 38th parallel again. MacArthur had a complete victory within his grasp, if they had given him the green light and supported him reasonably."

The war-hardened Stratemeyer, who was relieved from his command after a serious heart attack and sent home to recuperate and retire, paid a glowing tribute to MacArthur, whom he described as "the best boss I ever worked for and one of the greatest commanders of all time."

General Stratemeyer, does that article substantially represent your views?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir. I think I was a little enthusiastic when I talked to Lowell Limpus there, when I said they never could again have done these things. But at that time, I was sufficiently

strong in my opinion that the Chinese that were then fighting in North Korea could not have been supplied and would have had to pull out. I am as convinced of that today as I was then.

Mr. CARPENTER. Have you ever pondered or thought why this abnormal policy was imposed?

General STRATEMEYER. I have pondered it, yes, a lot.

Mr. CARPENTER. Have you ever reached a conclusion, in your estimation?

General STRATEMEYER. It is contrary to everything that every military commander that I have been associated with or from all of our history—he has never been in a position where he could not win the war he started to win. That is not American. That is not American. And who did it—I don't know. I know that General MacArthur's hands were tied, I am sure, not by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but by the then State Department. I make that as my opinion, and I still believe it.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff visit Tokyo quite frequently?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did they ever clarify the policy that was expected?

General STRATEMEYER. They did their best to; yes, sir. I do not think General MacArthur was ever satisfied that he had a constructive mission where he could go ahead and win. When I make that statement, I am not criticizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They had instructions, I am sure, from higher authority and those conferences were always pleasant. I was present and I always went with my chief to Korea.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you ever approach them to try to get the policy clarified?

General STRATEMEYER. General MacArthur did, yes, sir; every time they came out there. And they always left with the promise that they would do everything they could to help him, and which I think they tried to do.

Mr. CARPENTER. But it did not occur?

General STRATEMEYER. No, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. And they did attempt to clarify the policy?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did they ever make him any promises when they were in Tokyo that certain supplies, equipment, or manpower would be sent and then it would not be sent when they returned to Washington?

General STRATEMEYER. I couldn't make that statement; no, sir. I know that General MacArthur needed more ground people. General Vandenberg took good care of me. After this thing got going, I got some more groups and I got the bombers and I had a pretty good Air Force. But we never had enough ground troops. It was a question of manpower back here. They didn't have it. But it seems to me that a country the size of America, when you are in war, with all the National Guard divisions we were supposed to have had, that they could have found some troops to help MacArthur win. I think maybe their hands might have been tied. I don't know.

Mr. CARPENTER. General Stratemeyer, just what was the mission in Korea when you were there? What was the mission of the U. N. Command, as you saw it?

General STRATEMEYER. Well, about the time I left or, say, up to the time before the Chinese entered the war, my understanding of the mission was that we were to destroy the North Korean army and unify Korea. That was, as I remember it, the United Nations' directive, to unify Korea.

Mr. CARPENTER. Did you ever see such directive?

General STRATEMEYER. I don't recall. Those were the instructions I gave my troops, my air troops, and I think it was an understanding that that was the—in the beginning—that that was the U. N. directive.

Mr. CARPENTER. Well, after General MacArthur was relieved of command, was that mission changed?

General STRATEMEYER. I believe General Ridgway's mission was put on a little more definite terms. In other words, he was told to do certain things. I believe, if my memory serves me correctly, General Ridgway got a very definite mission.

Mr. CARPENTER. And are you familiar with what that mission was?

General STRATEMEYER. I don't recall, sir. I was interested primarily in the air and the support then of the ground troops. That is about the only job I had.

Mr. CARPENTER. What was the effect of the relief of General MacArthur on the command?

General STRATEMEYER. Well, I cried. I think the whole command, the morale dropped, it went way down, people could not believe it. a soldier could not believe it, an airman could not believe it, a sailor could not believe it. Everybody loved General MacArthur out there and I had never run into a man that served under him that didn't love him, and right out of a clear sky, he gets summarily dismissed. I know the reaction was great with the Japanese, too.

Mr. CARPENTER. There is no question but what MacArthur wanted to win the war; is that not right?

General STRATEMEYER. That is correct, sir.

Senator McCARRAN. That meant a collapse of morale in the higher echelons as well as the lower echelons of the Army, is that not true?

General STRATEMEYER. Out there, yes, sir. I would not say a collapse, Senator, but it was just like what happened to the 8th Army when General Walker was killed in that jeep accident. They loved General Walker. This was losing our commander who was the most courageous, bravest, senior commander that ever existed, and they fired him summarily without even giving him a chance to say goodbye to his command.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, would it interrupt the colonel if I went back to pick up a few loose ends?

Senator McCARRAN. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. General, you were, during the period from February 1946 to April 1949, assigned at posts in the United States, is that right?

General STRATEMEYER. At Mitchel Field Air Force Base yes, sir, Long Island.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any knowledge that during that time any individuals who had been in the Far East while you were there were under investigation on loyalty grounds?

General STRATEMEYER. The only information that I might have, and it was given to me by my sweet wife over there—she is well posted,

she is a brilliant woman—I got it from her when I got back, about what investigations were going on. I was too busy; I was organizing a new command; I didn't know about this Communist business.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your reply, General, necessarily implies that you were not asked any about individuals under investigation who had been in the Far East while you were there, is that true?

General STRATEMEYER. That is true, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. The investigative agencies of the Government never came to you for any information about any individuals that you might have known, or known of, while you were in the Far East?

General STRATEMEYER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. General, you have stated, I believe, that you were not informed while you were in the Far East of any reevaluation of China and Far East policies, is that correct?

General STRATEMEYER. That is after I joined General MacArthur?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

General STRATEMEYER. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would it be true, then, that at no time before the outbreak of the Korean war were you informed of any change in your mission?

General STRATEMEYER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether General MacArthur was informed of any change in his mission?

General STRATEMEYER. I am almost positive he was not. He had nothing to do with Korea except to maintain that small group over there with food and clothes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say he had nothing to do with Korea. Do you mean Korea was not under General MacArthur's command?

General STRATEMEYER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was commander in chief of the forces in the Far East?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. But didn't that include Korea?

General STRATEMEYER. No, sir; nor Formosa.

Mr. SOURWINE. How was Korea commanded and how was Formosa commanded?

Senator McCARRAN. Would you fix the dates of that period?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am talking about the period before the actual outbreak of the war in Korea.

General STRATEMEYER. Well, on Formosa, I think we just had some liaison people down there. It was just, you might say, like we had with South American countries or any other countries. We had some people down there and had a State Department man there and maintained liaison.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did have military officers there, did you not?

General STRATEMEYER. A few. I think I had one Air Force officer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did they report through Tokyo or through the American embassies?

General STRATEMEYER. I think all of General MacArthur's reports came through the State Department, as I recall. I got nothing direct from my man, as I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that situation the same in Korea also?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir. I think there the State Department man—by the way, he was a very fine man and a very courageous

and brave man. I think he later left. I forget his name now. I saw him over there all through that Korean thing and that is one State Department fellow that is all right in my opinion.

Mr. SOURWINE. My question involved no insidious implications. I just was trying to find out how detached Korea was from the Far East Command. You stated General MacArthur had nothing to do with it, yet he was supposed back here, at least, in the minds of the people in America, to be our supreme commander in the Far East. I think it is interesting that he had no command in Korea or in Formosa.

General STRATEMEYER. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have said that even the Army officers who were in Formosa reported back not through Tokyo but through the State Department?

General STRATEMEYER. I believe that is correct. I cannot swear to that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that true of Korea also?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir. We knew that that advisory group was over there. It is called KOMAG, Korean Military Advisory Group, but the only contact and the only responsibility General MacArthur had with those people was to see that they got their food and clothes.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was a one-way street?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. He—General MacArthur—was sort of a commissary officer?

General STRATEMEYER. That is all.

Mr. SOURWINE. But had no line of command, no chain of command, to receive any intelligence from them and they did not report to him, is that correct?

General STRATEMEYER. That is correct, as far as I know.

Now, I don't know everything that went on in General MacArthur's headquarters, but I know I got nothing from my people over there. We had a couple of Air fellows over there, but I got nothing from them that I recall.

Senator McCARRAN. That condition related by you under interrogation by Mr. Sourwine as regards General MacArthur continued on to a certain date. From there on, there was a change as to his authority over Korea, was there not?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator McCARRAN. When was that date?

General STRATEMEYER. That was the 26th of June 1950.

Senator McCARRAN. Then what became of it? What was his status from there on as regards Korea?

General STRATEMEYER. He had the responsibility of the whole campaign over there. It was turned over to him overnight.

Mr. SOURWINE. General, moving to another point, you will remember you have testified concerning a request by General MacArthur for permission to bomb north of the Yalu. Do you recall that, as a first reply, General MacArthur was told from Washington that consideration was being given to his recommendations?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall anything else about that first reply?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir. As I recall, the reply stated that they had some agreement with the British not to violate Manchuria without consulting the British. I am sure such a signal came in.

Mr. SOURWINE. General MacArthur's message had been sent around November 6 or 7, is that right?

General STRATEMEYER. As I recall, it was around the 6th or 7th.

Mr. SOURWINE. And the military situation at that time was what?

General STRATEMEYER. It was pretty good. But we knew these Chinese were coming in.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is, the enemy troops were actually crossing the river at that time?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir. That was these volunteers, about which the papers published so much.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were there any British in Korea at that time?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir; a very fine British brigade.

Mr. SOURWINE. How many men would there be altogether in that British brigade?

General STRATEMEYER. I would think, as I recall, there were—I would say between 3,500 and 5,000.

Mr. SOURWINE. And how many men were there altogether engaged on our side in the conflict at that time?

General STRATEMEYER. Well, we had six divisions. Take my Air. Well, it is way, way up in the thousands. I can't give you that number.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was in the hundreds of thousands, was it not, General?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir; including the Koreans. There is no question about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. And yet General MacArthur was told that he could not move, that consideration could not be given to his request to move against that threat without consultation with the British?

General STRATEMEYER. I don't know whether it was worded that way. I think it was worded that he was not permitted to go across at this time because of some agreement with the British to consult them prior to any such action.

Mr. SOURWINE. However it was worded, it means substantially that he was not to be permitted to move because we had to consult the British?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And, yet, the British had no actual responsibility at the top command level in Korea, did they?

General STRATEMEYER. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. The United States Army was ostensibly the instrument of the United Nations to fight the Korean war, was it not?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. General, do you remember any occasion when General MacArthur sent a message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and asked them to bring the matter directly before the President so that the President himself might make the decision?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Tell us about that.

General STRATEMEYER. Well, that was after we were turned down on this action that I talked about awhile ago, of taking out Sinuiju

and that bridge there between Antung and Sinuiju. They sent this message back which you just discussed, and then General MacArthur went back and in that message asked that it be taken to the President, that he could not accept—you see, I had planned this, it was all planned, and we were going to do it. His message read that he intended to do it unless he was advised to the contrary. That brought a reply. Then this other message. When they replied as they did, then this other message General MacArthur would not accept, and that, I believe, is where he indicated that it was his desire that this be brought to the attention of the President.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether, in fact, General MacArthur's message and recommendations were brought to the attention of the President?

General STRATEMEYER. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you do not know?

General STRATEMEYER. No, sir, I do not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. I take it from that answer that there was never any indication to you, or to your knowledge to General MacArthur, that the President was advised?

General STRATEMEYER. No, sir, I would have no way of knowing that, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You got no message back from the President as Commander in Chief?

General STRATEMEYER. Not from the President. We finally got authority to bomb.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you get a message back from the Joint Chiefs of Staff which indicated that the President had been consulted in the matter?

General STRATEMEYER. I didn't, no, sir; and I don't believe General MacArthur did.

Mr. SOURWINE. General, you stated during the course of your earlier testimony, and I am paraphrasing you now, that our policies appeared to have been based on fear; fear of what Russia might do. Is that a fair paraphrase of what you said?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. General, have you kept abreast, through reading, of the current developments in our foreign policy down to date?

General STRATEMEYER. I believe so, as much as I can, as much as my eyes will allow me to read. That is all I have done since January of 1952, up to yesterday afternoon.

Mr. SOURWINE. From what you know of the current trends in our foreign policy, have we, since Korea, abandoned that policy dictated by fear?

General STRATEMEYER. That is a difficult question for a serviceman to answer. I don't know anything about politics. All my life has been spent in the military. But there is something going on, has been going on, every since World War II ended, right up to this minute, there is some hidden force or some hidden power or something that is influencing our people. They don't act like Americans. Americans are supposed to have guts, and our policy, as I read it and see it, it is wishy-washy, and appeasing.



Please, I am not criticizing our President, I am not criticizing the Congress, and I am not criticizing Secretary Dulles. But there is something wrong. I don't know what it is. I have been trying to inform myself. But there is something. Good old Americanism doesn't exist like it did when I went to West Point as a youngster. What it is, I don't know.

Senator McCARRAN. General, looking back over our history, do you remember the expression "Give me liberty or give me death"?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator McCARRAN. Do you remember the expression "54-40 or fight"?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator McCARRAN. Do you remember the expression with reference to the British Fleet then in Venezuela waters "This fiat is law," referring to the Monroe Doctrine?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator McCARRAN. Do you find that prevalent today, that spirit, that made those enunciations?

General STRATEMEYER. It certainly has not been prevalent, Senator McCarran, since World War II was over. Whether the present administration is correcting it or not, I don't know. I am not a politician; I don't know. But to me, there is something lacking in leadership somewhere that we can get kicked around like we are being kicked around. God, America has never taken anything from people like we are taking today. Why do we do it? Who is the force? What does that? I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have no more questions.

Senator McCARRAN. I would like to ask a question or two with reference to during the early part of your testimony dwelling on the conditions that surrounded the Yalu River. You made mention of dams and powerplants on the Yalu. My recollection is that this morning you stated, as I recall it, you were not allowed to bomb the dams or powerplants.

General STRATEMEYER. That is correct, sir.

Senator McCARRAN. What significance did the dams on the Yalu or the powerplants have?

General STRATEMEYER. The reason I wanted to take those powerplants out is that I knew they supplied the power clear up to Mukden, and also, by the way, down to Port Arthur. If we took them out, it was going to make it a little tough for the Chinese.

Senator McCARRAN. If you took them out, you would cripple the enemy to that extent, would you not?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator McCARRAN. That is usually the object in war, is it not?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir. I believe, Senator, that authority finally came through. But why didn't they let me do it at the beginning instead of waiting 4 or 5 months?

Senator McCARRAN. In the meantime, during the period where you were waiting for the authority to do that, our boys were being killed off, is that not true?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. General Stratemeyer, were you familiar with the planning and forecasting of the Korean war, the end of it, apprised of the situation here in Washington that they were planning, forecasting the end, and furnishing of supplies, and asking for money, accordingly?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. Now, prior to the entrance of the Chinese into the Korean conflict, did you know the planning and forecasting that was going on in Washington at that time?

General STRATEMEYER. No, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. I would like to read certain data revealed by hearings before the Preparedness Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services. On July 25, 1950, Louis Johnson [Secretary of National Defense] before the House Appropriations Committee stated:

"The Korean situation, I hope, is a 6- or 8-month proposition."

Then the following:

Marshall guidance directive of September 27, 1950, placed the end of the war for planning purposes on June 30, 1951. (Marshall became Secretary of National Defense on September 21, 1950.)

After the Chinese entered the war openly in November 1950 the basic assumption was not changed.

January 6, 1951 directive from Marshall still stated: "Combat operations in Korea will be concluded by June 30, 1951."

JCS on April 11, 1951, recommended that the planning assumption that Korean hostilities would end June 30 be altered to December 31, 1951. Marshall agreed for planning and programing purposes but not for budget purposes.

General STRATEMEYER. I recall some of that information that you just read.

Mr. CARPENTER. I would like for you to comment on this. In other words, the same programing and forecasting before the Chinese entered as they did later, is that logic? Here we have a different force.

General STRATEMEYER. We had a whole new war.

Mr. CARPENTER. A large mission, a whole new war, and yet the planning purposes were exactly the same. Can you comment on that?

General STRATEMEYER. No; I am not a planner. I have always been fortunate enough to be a commander.

Mr. CARPENTER. Is that logical planning?

General STRATEMEYER. Well, I don't know what was back of it. I don't want to say it isn't because there is another angle to it. We were trying to build up, I am sure, back home. We found out what shape we were in when this Korean war started. Whether the planning originally was big enough to take care of this Chinese problem

or not I don't know. It doesn't sound logical; no. But I don't want to get in that. I don't know enough about it.

Mr. CARPENTER. Most of the time over there, there seemed to be a lack of firm policy. Is that a fair statement?

General STRATEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. Would a firm policy in any way have split our alliances over there with the various nations furnishing troops?

General STRATEMEYER. There, again, you are asking me a question. I am a military fellow. I don't know what is going on in the minds of the British or the Australians. Certainly, I don't think it would have made any difference with the people who were fighting in Korea under General MacArthur. I had an Australian fighter squadron and they would have continued to fight and I think would have been very happy to accompany us up there and probably would have, if we had gotten the authority. I think the British brigade and the Philippine battalion, I think they would have all continued to fight. But what their governments would have done, I don't know.

Mr. CARPENTER. General Stratemeyer, you have had long experience, you have worked in many lands, and I am sure you have made considerable study since you have returned from the Far East. What is your opinion as to severing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union?

General STRATEMEYER. Boy, if I had the power to do it, I would sever diplomatic relations with Russia and every Communist satellite and I would kick them out of America.

Mr. CARPENTER. That is an unequivocal statement.

General STRATEMEYER. I meant every word of it, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. I am sure you did. I would like to ask you the same question as to the United Nations.

General STRATEMEYER. Well, there, again, you put me in a position where being a military man, I remember when the United Nations was opened, everybody had great hopes for what it was going to do. But I am going to ask myself a question: What constructive good has the United Nations done for the United States of America? And my answer to that question, to myself, is I can think of very, very little or maybe nothing.

Mr. CARPENTER. Now, we have gone over your career through the two wars, and have been asking you questions. I am wondering if you have any other information that you would like to impart to this committee.

General STRATEMEYER. Well, I have made a couple of notes here. I don't know whether they are worth anything or not. One of the things that has disturbed me and I worry about is why does our press, a great part of it, why do most of the commentators, and why do writers, smear patriotic Americans? And by patriotic Americans, I mean men like you Senator McCarran, Senator Jenner, Senator

McCarthy, Congressman Velde, Congressman Martin Dies? Anybody that points a finger at communism is smeared in our country. I don't understand it. Why? That isn't American. We want to get these devils out of our country. I tell you, America had better wake up, and our press had better wake up, those people who smear people who are trying to uncover and get rid of these thieves, murderers, and liars.

I would like to say a word about, to my mind, the greatest military man alive today, and in my opinion one of the greatest statesmen today, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. I never knew General Douglas MacArthur well until I was fortunate enough to be asked by him to serve him in Japan and Korea. He is one of the most humble, patriotic, honest, intelligent men I have ever known. I love him. I give you an example of what he did in Japan. As you know, we had an Allied Council there. The Russians were a member of that Allied Council. Did they use that Allied Council as a sounding board like they do here in the United Nations, like they did at Geneva, like they do every place? No, sir. The Russians got nowhere in Japan, and the one man in the world the Russians fear is General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. God bless him, I just hope he lives to be a hundred.

Another great American was General MacArthur's ambassador, William J. Sebald, who sat on that Allied Council and saw that the Russians didn't put out any propaganda. You were there, Colonel Carpenter, you know what went on. Also that fine Australian, Roy Hodgson, is another example of people who are forthright and forceful with the Russians.


Our country today, to my mind, needs nationalism, patriotism, Americanism, like it never needed it before in its history, and it should be taught right from the time a youngster goes to kindergarten. We should have reverence for our flag; we should have reverence for our Constitution, our Bill of Rights, and our school children should be taught that. For some unknown reason today, they are forgetting American history and those things they used to respect, at least I did when I was a boy. I was taught at West Point "duty, honor, country," and I think that motto could well go to all red-blooded Americans. We need it today.

I would like to say something complimentary for our Congressmen from Florida, our Senators, particularly Senator Holland, Senator Smathers, and Congressman Herlong. They are Americans. They are the kind of people that we need more of. We need more Senator McCarrans; we need more Senator Jenners; we need more guts. That is all, sir.

Mr. CARPENTER. I would also like to be inserted the map of China and of the Yalu River as seen here on the board and made a part of the record.

Senator McCARRAN. It will be made a part of the record.  
(The map referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 456" and appears below.)

## EXHIBIT No. 456



Mr. CARPENTER. Next, I would like to have inserted into the record an excerpt from the Congressional Record, Appendix of March 18, 1952, page A1764.

Senator McCARRAN. That will be included in the record as well as any other documents referred to in the record and not read in full.

(The excerpt referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 457" and is as follows:)

## EXHIBIT No. 457

## GENERAL SAYS MACARTHUR COULD HAVE ENDED WAR

Extension of remarks of Hon. W. J. Bryan Dorn, of South Carolina, in the House of Representatives, Monday, March 17, 1952

Mr. DORN. Mr. Speaker, Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer is one of the greatest air commanders in American history. In a recent interview General Stratemeyer expressed opinions about the Korean war that will be of interest to all Members of Congress. I agree with General Stratemeyer that we could have won the Korean war last year and saved many American lives.

The following article is the viewpoint of a great American who opposes appeasement and who is aware that the best way to prevent a general war is by decisive action in Korea:

## "GENERAL SAYS MACARTHUR COULD HAVE ENDED WAR

“(By Lowell Limpus)”

“Convincing evidence that Gen. Douglas MacArthur could have won the Korean war easily, if Washington had permitted him to do so, was offered here today by the expert best qualified to know and judge the facts.

“Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, until recently commander of all U. N. air forces in Korea, declared flatly that General MacArthur would have decisively defeated the Chinese Reds if his superiors had followed his advice and let him

alone. The veteran airman added, however, that the opportunity for such a smashing victory—without heavy losses—no longer exists. Washington frittered it away long ago.

"Breaking the long silence which had been imposed upon him by military regulations until his retirement a short time ago, the commander in chief of the Far East air forces explained: 'We could have smashed them completely, if we could have crossed the Yalu River at the right time. I had the planes and the boys were anxious to cut loose. General MacArthur wanted to let me go. We had control of the air and practically no opposition—except some antiaircraft fire.

" 'If MacArthur's hands hadn't been tied, we were prepared to pulverize the Communist airdromes, supply lines, and depots so completely that they never again could have moved any large number of troops or equipment southward. They'd never have gotten near the thirty-eighth parallel again. MacArthur had a complete victory within his grasp, if they had given him the green light and supported him reasonably.'

"The war-hardened Stratemeyer, who was relieved from his command after a serious heart attack and sent home to recuperate and retire, paid a glowing tribute to MacArthur, whom he described as 'the best boss I ever worked for and one of the greatest commanders of all time.'

"He gave almost equally high praise to Gen. Matthew Ridgway, whose air forces he commanded after MacArthur's relief, but carefully pointed out his belief that Ridgway no longer has the same chance to win the war easily, which MacArthur had back in 1950. He said that Washington had tied the hands of both until the Reds built up their forces so that the 'golden opportunity' was frittered away.

"General Stratemeyer, now convalescing at the Winter Park home of Maj. Maj. Gen. Leo Al Walton, retired, left no possible doubt that he was and is 100 percent in sympathy with MacArthur and that he regards the latter's relief as a tragic mistake. He also is clearly disgusted with a policy which forces us to fight a war we can't win.

"The newly retired general, who is recognized as one of the world's great air commanders, has been besieged with requests to express his opinion of the Korean struggle—especially since his official retirement on January 31—but he kept his lips sealed until today. Then he got a lot of things off his chest.

"He explained that much of MacArthur's brilliance lay in his ability to outline complicated maneuvers to subordinates, explain what he desired and then refrain from interference as long as his plans were being carried out. 'He gives a man a job to do, trusts him and leaves him alone to do that job,' said Stratemeyer.

" 'I've never served under anybody that compares with him,' went on the Air general. 'The man is almost unbelievable. He never worries. I flew with him from Japan to Suwon on his first trip to the front, June 29, 1950. He slept on the way over and on the way back. He's always relaxed. I think that's one reason he's in such remarkably good physical condition.

" 'And don't let anybody kid you about that. I've spent many hours in his company and I can't see any signs that he's getting older. I believe he'll probably live to be 100—I hope so—and that he will be able to render more magnificent service to America in the meantime.'

"General Stratemeyer's retirement marked the end of almost 37 years commissioned service for the veteran airman. He graduated from West Point in 1915, in the same class with Gens. Dwight Eisenhower, Omar Bradley, Joseph McNarney, and James A. Van Fleet, all of whom have been close friends. He went into the Air Corps in 1916, where he became a skilled bomber pilot.

"Rising rapidly in World War II, he first directed America's great pilot-training program and then became Chief of the Air Staff and the right-hand man of Gen. Henry H. Arnold (who once said the country would be forever indebted to Stratemeyer). Arnold finally sent him to the Pacific as air commander of the China Burma-India theater, where he first whipped the Japanese in Burma and then supervised much of the long-range air war against Japan.

"After the war he took over the United States Air Defense Command and then the Continental Air Command, with headquarters at Mitchell Air Force Base, N. Y., until he was recalled to the Far East to take command of all our air forces there. He began service in his fourth war when he went into action once more, as soon as the North Koreans invaded South Korea. He had full charge of all U. N. air power until his heart gave out 8 months ago.

"Friends believe that intense worry over the effects of MacArthur's removal contributed to his collapse."

Mr. CARPENTER. That is all of the exhibits I have.

Senator McCARRAN. General Stratemeyer, in closing this hearing, I wish to pay tribute to you and to your fellow citizens here in Orlando. I was pleased to note that at the entrance to the hotel at which I am staying, there is a plaque which I would urge all to read and to reflect upon. Indeed, it bears a message that could well be repeated throughout the land: "Don't think the danger of communism in this country is past."

The message further identifies among the sources of Communist strength the greedy and ambitious politicians who advocate Government ownership of private property and those who urge us not to antagonize the Russians, to get along with them, which means giving in to them. The conclusion of the brief statement is that the price of these noble-sounding ideas is the loss of liberty bit by bit.

Your great service here this morning, General Stratemeyer, has been to provide some of the historical details based upon your experience. Thank you, again, and may God keep you and this great, good country of ours, America.

The hearing is concluded.

(Whereupon, at 10:45 a. m., the hearing was concluded.)


(Exhibits 455A and 455B referred to on p. 1714 are as follows:)



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